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Abstract We introduce reactive Kripke models for intuitionistic logic and show
that the reactive semantics is stronger than the ordinary semantics. We develop Beth
tableaux for the reactive semantics.
Keywords Intuitionistic logic · Reactive Kripke models · Beth tableaux
1 Introduction
In Gabbay (2008) we introduced the idea of reactivity and studied reactive Kripke
models for modal logics. In many subsequent papers we studied other reactive sys-
tems such as reactive argumentation frames, reactive automata, reactive grammars,
reactive preferential logics, reactive contrary to duties, reactive inheritance networks,
and many more.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce reactive intuitionistic frames (Kripke
frames and Beth frames) and study their expressive power and properties.
We begin by briefly introducing the idea of reactive networks (including reactive
Kripke models). Consider the network of Fig. 1.
Let us first ignore the double arrow in Fig. 1. Without the double arrow, Fig. 1 is a
three point Kripke model for intuitionistic logic. So for example if we want to evaluate
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Fig. 1 E1
a  p → q, we must check whether there exists a higher point s to a (including a
itself) with x  p but x  q.
The above definition is set-theoretical. The notion x  A is defined inductively,
and the graph of Fig. 1 without the double arrow is just a graph suggesting a Kripke
model with a reflexive and transitive binary relation.
To be more precise, Fig. 1 (without the double arrow) suggests a set S = {a, b, c},
a relation R = {(a, b), (b, c)} and the reflexive and transitive closure of R being
R∗ = {(a, a), (a, b), (a, c), (b, b), (b, c), (c, c)}. If we use an explicit formula for
R∗, we get: x R∗y iff x = y or x Ry or for some k ≥ 1 and some t1, . . . , tk , we have
x Rt1 ∧ t1 Rt2 ∧ . . . ∧ tk−1 Rtk ∧ tk Ry.
The assignment h to the atoms is also indicated in the figure.
So the Kripke model is (S, R∗, a, h), with h(p) = {c} and h(q) = ∅.
So to check whether a  p → q we simply ask set-theoretically whether ∃x(a R∗x
and x  p and x  q).
To introduce the reactive approach we envisage ourselves walking along the arrows
of the graph from point a onwards and at each point x that we pass, we evaluate x  p
and x  q and compare. This is an actual walk and search along the graph.
Of course, the end result is the same. If there is an x such that a R∗x and x  p and
x  q then we will walk into it sooner or later and vice versa.
Now given this ‘walk along the graph’ point of view, the reactive double arrow
makes sense. What it does is the following: As we cross from a to b, the double arrow
gets activated and disconnects the path from b to c. So we do not get to the point c
where c  p and c  q. Without getting to c, we will report that a  p → q holds,
because we cannot get to the counterexample, etc. So in the reactive model of Fig. 1
with the double arrow, we have a  p → q.
We now sum up. We introduced two ideas here.
1. Evaluation in Kripke models is done by ‘walk along the arrows and check and
report’ policy.
2. Double arrows along the way can disconnect connections and control where we
can go.1
1 There are more complex options for reactivity:
(a) Double arrows can switch arrows on and off.
(b) Double arrows can emanate from other double arrows.
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Consider now Fig. 2. In this figure, when we walk along a → b → c we cannot
continue from d to e, because d → e gets disconnected. However, when we walk
along a → c → d, we can continue to e because there is no double arrow along the
path.
Section 2 gives the formal definitions involved and introduces the reactive models.
We also show that we get a richer semantics than ordinary Kripke models.
The idea of reactivity is a general one and can apply to Beth models as well. Beth
models are like Kripke models except the inductive truth definition is different. We
need the notion of an Belt anti-chain of points. Given (S, R∗, a, h), and t ∈ S then a
set T ⊆ S is a Belt anti-chain for t if all points of T are R∗ not comparable and every
maximal R∗ chain beginning at t must meet the Belt T .
We have t  A iff there exists an antichain Belt T for t such that for all x ∈ T, x  A.
Turning a model reactive is even easier, if we give the correct definition of a reac-
tive path. A reactive path beginning at t is a trace of a walk along the arrows from t
onwards, where all double arrows are taken into account. So hopefully we can define
reactive Beth models as well.
In Fig. 2 there are two maximal reactive paths a → b → d and a → c → d → e.
2 Reactive Kripke frames
This section introduces reactive Kripke frames for intuitionistic logic and shows that
intuitionistic propositional logic is complete for such frames. We also show that there
are intermediate logics which are complete for a class of reactive Kripke frames but
are not complete for any class of ordinary Kripke frames.
Thus reactive Kripke frames is a richer and stronger semantics than ordinary frames.
The above also means that we can study a richer class of intermediate logics, e.g.
intermediate logics generated by finite reactive frames. We shall see in Remark 3.8
what kind of Heyting like algebras one gets from finite reactive frames.
Footnote 1 continued
(c) We can have an inductively iterated version of the above.
In this paper we are keeping the reactivity simple.
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To appreciate the opportunities opening for us through the notion of reactive Kripke
frames for intuitionistic logic, consider a famous beautiful theorem of L. Maksimova
Maksimova (1977).
• There are only seven intermediate logics which have interpolation
Is this still true if we take into account logics generated by reactive frames? The notion
of ‘logic’ may not be the same!
A later section will provide tableaux for logics defined by finite frames.
Definition 2.1 (Ordinary Kripke models for intuitionistic propositional logic) A
Kripke model has the form m = (S, R, R∗, a, h) where S is a non-empty set of
worlds and R ⊆ S × S is a binary relation on S. R∗ is the reflexive and transitive
closure of R,2 a ∈ S is the actual world and h is an assignment, giving for each atomic
q a subset h(q) ⊆ S.
The system F = (S, R, R∗, a) is called a Kripke frame.
The following holds
t ∈ h(q) ∧ t R∗s ⇒ s ∈ h(q). (∗)
The satisfaction relation is defined as follows, for t ∈ S and a propositional formula
A.
1. t  q iff t ∈ h(q), for q atomic
2. t  A ∧ B iff t  A and t  B
t  A ∨ B iff t  A or t  B.
3. t  A → B iff for all s such that tR∗s, if s  A then s  B
4. t  ¬A iff for all s such that tR∗s we have s  A.
5. We say A holds in the model iff a  A.
6. Note we have not used R at all, only R∗, and that models have actual worlds and
satisfaction in a model is defined as satisfaction in the actual world.
This presentation is for later comparison, with the reactive case.
Theorem 2.2 Intuitionistic propositional logic is complete for the semantics of
Definition 2.1.
Proof Well known result. unionsq
Definition 2.3 (Pre-reactive Kripke models) A pre-reactive Kripke model has the
form (S, S∗, R, a, h) where S is a non-empty set, a ∈ S, R ⊆ S × S is a binary
relation (not necessarily reflexive nor transitive) and S∗ is the set of all R increasing
sequences β of elements from S of the form β = (a0, a1, . . . , an) such that a0 = a
and for i = 0, . . . , n − 1 we have ai Rai+1. We denote an by |β|. h is an assignment
giving for each atomic q a subset h(q) ⊆ S such that
t ∈ h(q) ∧ t Rs ⇒ s ∈ h(q).
2 We have xR∗y iff x = y or x Ry or ∃t1, . . . , tm (x Rt1 ∧ t1 Rt2 ∧ . . . tm−1 Rtm ∧ tm Ry), for some m ≥ 1.
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We define satisfaction for β, a sequence in S∗, as follows. (We need the notion of:
β ′ is an extension of β iff β is an initial sequence of β ′, i.e. β = (a, t1, . . . , tk) and
β ′ = (a, t1, . . . , tk+n) n ≥ 0).
1. β  q iff |β| ∈ h(q), for q atomic.
2. β  A ∧ B iff β  A and β  B.
β  A ∨ B iff β  A or β  B.
3. β  A → B iff for every extension β ′ of β, we have that if β ′  A then β ′  B.
4. β  ¬A iff for all extension β ′ of β we have β ′  A.
5. A holds in the model if a  A.
Lemma 2.4 Let m = (S, S∗, R, a, h) be a model. Let R∗ be the reflexive and transi-
tive closure of R. Consider the model n = (S, R, R∗, a, h). Then we have for every
β ∈ S∗
β  A in m iff |β|  A in n.
Proof By induction on A. The crucial point is A → B.
1. Assume β  A → B. Then for all β ′ extending β we have that β ′  A implies
β ′  B.
By the induction hypothesis we have if |β ′|  A then |β ′|  B. We now show
|β|  A → B.
Let s be such that |β|R∗s, then |β| = s or |β|Rs or there exist s0, s1, . . . , sm such
that s0 = |β| and sm = s and for i = 0, . . . , m − 1 we have si Rsi+1. Hence
β ′ = β ∗ (s1, . . . , sm) is an extension of β with |β ′| = sm = s. Therefore if s  A
then |β ′|  A, hence β ′  A by the induction hypothesis, hence β ′  B, hence
|β ′|  B, i.e. s  B.
2. Now assume |β|  A → B. Let β ′ extend β. Hence |β|R∗|β ′|. So if β ′  A then
|β ′|  A hence |β ′|  B hence β ′  B.
The proof for ¬A is similar. unionsq
Remark 2.5 The second type of model is easier to turn reactive. In this new type of
model, we view the evaluation of A → B at a node t as ‘going along the relation R
and at whatever point t ′ we reach, if t ′  A then t ′  B.’ So in this definition we
actually have to traverse the arcs of the model.
Note that R needs not be reflexive nor transitive. We get these properties from the
evaluation process. So consider Figs. 3 and 4.
Figure 3 gives S1 ={t, s},R1 ={(t, s)}. Figure 4 gives S2 ={t, s}, R2 ={(t, t), (t, s)}.
We have S∗1 = {(t), (t, s)} and S∗2 = {(t), (t, . . .
m times
, t, s)|m = 0, 1, 2, . . .}. S∗1 corre-
sponds to the ordinary Kripke model with two linear points 1 < 2 (as in Fig. 3) and
S∗2 corresponds to the ordinary Kripke model with the infinite comb of Fig. 5 such
that the assignments to the points in {0, 1, . . .} are all identical (representing the point
t and also the assignment to the points in {w0, w1, w2, . . . , wn . . .} are all identical,
(representing the point s).
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Definition 2.6 (Reactive intuitionistic Kripke frame) A reactive intuitionistic Kripke
frame has the form (S, R, a), where a ∈ S and R is a set of pairs of the form
1. (x, y) ∈ S × S called arrows
2. ((x, y), (u, v)) ∈ S2 × S2 called reactive double arrows.
Example 2.7 A reactive frame, see Fig. 6.
We have R = {(t, s), (t, t), ((t, t), (t, s))} and a = t
Definition 2.8 (How reactivity operates)
1. Let m = (S, R, a) be a frame. Let (t, s) ∈ R be an arrow. Define R(t,s) to be
R(t,s) = R−{(x, y) | ((t, s), (x, y)) ∈ R}. R(t,s) is the result of traversing the arc
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Fig. 6 A5 s
t
t → s and cancelling all connections as indicated by double arrows emanating
from t → s.
2. Let β = (a, t1, . . . , tk). We now define Rβ by induction on k. For k = 1, we let
Rβ = R(a,t1), provided (a, t1) ∈ R.
Assume Rβ has been defined for β = (a, t1, . . . , tk) and assume (tk, tk+1) ∈ Rβ .
Define Rβ ′ for β ′ = (a, t1, . . . , tk+1) to be Rβ ′ = (Rβ)(tk ,tk+1).
3. Let Rβ be a reactive relation as defined in (2) where β = (a, t1, . . . , tk).
Let
β0 = β
β1 = (a, t1, . . . , tk+1)
...
βn = (a, t1, . . . , tk+n)
We say βn for n ≥ 0 is a legitimate extension of β iff n = 0 or n ≥ 1 and the
following holds.
• (tk, tk+1) ∈ Rβ
• Rβ1 is obtained from Rβ as in (1) above
...
• (tk+n−1, tk+n) ∈ Rβn−1
• Rβn is obtained from Rβn−1 as in (1) above.
4. We say β1 is an immediate legitimate extension of β.
Lemma 2.9 Let (S, R(a), a) be a reactive Kripke frame. Let β be a legitimate exten-
sion of (a), and β = (a). Write β = (a, t1, . . . , tk). Then we have a Rt1, t1 Rt2, . . . ,
tk−1 Rtk, where R = {(x, y)|(x, y) ∈ S × S ∩ R}.
Proof By induction on k. For k = 1 we do have a Rt1.
We see from the construction of any Rβ that we have Rβ ⊆ R.
Hence if β ′ = β ∗ (tk+1) with |β| = tk and (tk, tk+1) ∈ Rβ , then we have tk
Rtk+1. unionsq
Definition 2.10 (Satisfaction in a reactive model)
1. Let (S, R, a) be a reactive frame. Let R = {(x, y)|x, y ∈ S and (x, y) ∈ R}. Let
h be an assignment such that
t ∈ h(q) and t Rs implies s ∈ h(q).
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Let β be a legitimate extension of (a). Let Rβ be the corresponding relation. Let
mβ = (S, Rβ, |β|, h). Note that if γ = (|β|, t1, . . . , tm) is a legitimate extension
of |β| in mβ , then β1 = β∗(t1, . . . , tm) is a legitimate extension of (a) in (S, R, a).
2. We define satisfaction as follows:
• β  q iff |β| ∈ h(q), for q atomic
• β  A ∧ B iff β  A and β  B
• β  A ∨ B iff β  A or β  B
3. β  A → B in mβ iff for every legitimate extension β ′ of β, if β ′  A in mβ ′
then β ′  B in mβ ′ .
4. β  ¬A in mβ iff for all legitimate extensions β ′ of β we have β ′  A in mβ ′ .
5. We say (S, R, a, h)  A iff (a)  A, (in words: A holds in the model).
Lemma 2.11 Let (S, R, a, h) be a model and assume that β  A in mβ and that β ′
is a legitimate extension of β, then β ′  A in mβ ′ .
Proof By induction on A.
1. For A atomic, this follows from a previous Lemma 2.9.
2. The cases of ∧ and ∨ are immediate.
3. Assume β  A → B, then for any legitimate extension β ′ of β, if β ′  A in mβ ′
then β ′  B in mβ ′ .
But now since any legitimate extension β ′′ of β ′ is also a legitimate extension of
β we get that β ′  A → B in mβ ′ .
4. The case of ¬ is similar.
unionsq
Example 2.12 (Satisfaction in the frame of Fig. 6) Let q be atomic. Let h(q) be {s}.
Then
1. (t)  q
2. (t)  ¬q
3. (t)  ¬q → q.
(1) and (2) are clear. To show (3), note that β = (t, t) is a legitimate extension of (t)
and R(t,t) is
{(t, t), ((t, t), (t, s)}.
In (S, R(t,t), (t, t) we have (t, t)  ¬q but (t, t)  q.
Lemma 2.13 The logic defined by reactive satisfaction is intuitionistic logic.3
Proof
1. Since ordinary pre-reactive models are reactive models, (by Definition 2.3 and
Lemma 2.4) the logic is not stronger than intuitionistic logic.
3 Let K be a class of reactive frames. Let A be a wff which holds in any frame in the class under any
assignment. Let Logic(K) be the set of all such wffs A. Then Logic(K) is a ‘logic’. All its wffs are classical
theorems but this ‘logic’ may not be closed under substitution.
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2. From Lemma 2.11 we see the logic is not weaker either.
unionsq
Theorem 2.14 The logic of the frame Fig. 6 is not complete for any class of ordinary
intuitionistic Kripke frames.
Proof The proof has four parts, (A)–(D).
(A)
(A) The following formula holds in the frame of Fig. 6, under any h,
(a) x ∨ (x → (q ∨ ¬q)), x, q atomic
(b) (x → y) ∨ (y → x), x, y atomic.
We check (1).
If x = ⊥ at (t) then to falsify x → (q ∨¬q) we need to go to (t, s) where x can
hold. We cannot go to (t, t) because (t, t)  x . At (t, s) clearly q ∨ ¬q holds.
We check (2).
Assume x → y is false at (t). Then we have either
(t, . . .
m times
, t)  x and (t, . . .
m times
, t)  y or
(t, . . .
n times
, t, s)  x and (t, . . .
n times
, t, s)  y, m, n ≥ 0.
In the first case, we have (t)  x and hence (t)  y → x .
In the second case we have (t, s)  x, (t, s)  y. Hence (t)  ¬y and so
(t)  y → x .
(B) We now show that any ordinary frame which satisfies (1) and (2) under any h
must be either a single point or the frame of Fig. 3.
This is well known because otherwise either (1) or (2) can be falsified. (1) is
falsified by a 3 point chain and (2) by a two point anti-chain. So we can have
neither.
(C) We now show that in Fig. 3 or in a single point (3) must hold.
(a) x ∨ ¬x ∨ (¬x → x).
To falsify x ∨ ¬x we need Fig. 3 with t  x and s  x but from the latter it
follows that t  ¬¬x holds and hence t  ¬x → x .
(D) Our proof is concluded because Example 2.12 shows that (3) can be falsified in
the frame of Fig. 6.
unionsq
Remark 2.15 It is helpful to have another view of Fig. 6. The frame has two paths, as
in Fig. 7
We can view Fig. 7 as an ordinary 3 point Kripke model with the understanding that
the assignment at t and (t, t) is the same, i.e. for every q, t ∈ h(q) iff (t, t) ∈ h(q).
This is common to reactive models, that they can be ‘unfolded’ as models of paths
with restrictions on the assignments. Gabbay and Marcelino (2009) studies such mod-
els. We examine this notion in the next section.
3 Folding reactive frames
We saw in the last section that the reactive frame of Fig. 6 can be unfolded into the
ordinary frame of Fig. 7, with the added understanding that the points (t) and (t, t)
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Fig. 7 A6
t
(t, s) (t, t)
must give the same values to the atoms. This unfolding process can be done in a sys-
tematic manner, and it seems to have significance for developing Beth tableaux for
reactive intuitionistic logics. So in this section we study it in detail. We are going to
unfold and then fold again.
Let (S, R, a) be a reactive frame. Let β be a legitimate path of the form β =
(a, t1, . . . , tk). We saw that we can calculate Rβ ⊆ R. Let Fβ = (S, Rβ, |β|).
If S is finite and β ranges over all legitimate paths, we get only a finite number of
different frames Fβ . Let us take advantage of this.
Definition 3.1 (Path equivalence relation) Let m = (S, R, a, h) be a reactive model.
Define an equivalence relation on the paths of the model as follows:
• β ≡ γ iff |β| = |γ | and Rβ = Rγ .
Let  be the set of equivalence classes, {β| ≡ | β a legitimate path extending (a)}.
Then  is finite.
Define ρ (respectively ρ1) on  as follows:
• β/ ≡ ργ/ ≡ (respectively: β/ ≡ ρ1γ / ≡) iff for some β1 ≡ β and γ1 ≡ γ we
have γ1 is a legitimate extension (respectively: an immediate legitimate extension)
of β1.
Lemma 3.2 ρ is reflexive and transitive, and is the reflexive and transitive closure of
ρ1.
Proof Reflexivity is not a problem. We show transitivity.
Claim If β1 is a legitimate extension of α1 and β1 ≡β2 and γ2 is a legitimate
extension of β2, then there exists a γ1 ≡ γ2 such that γ1 is a legitimate extension of
α1.
We now prove the claim:
1. Since β1 is a legitimate extension of α1, we have that β1 = α1 or for some k ≥ 1,
we have β1 = α1 ∗ (t1, . . . , tk) where |α1|Rt1 ∧ t1 Rt2 ∧ . . . tk−1 Rtk and |β1| = tk .
2. Since β1 ≡ β2 we get that Rβ1 = Rβ2 .
3. Since γ2 is a legitimate extension of β2, we have γ2 = β2 or for some m ≥ 1 we
also have (s1, . . . , sm) such that γ2 = β2 ∗ (s1, . . . , sm) and |β2|Rs1 ∧ s1 Rs2 ∧
. . . sm−1 Rsm and |γ2| = sm .
Consider the path
γ1 = α1 ∗ (t1, . . . , tk) ∗ (s1, . . . , sm).
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where if β1 = α1 then (t1, . . . , tk) does not appear and if γ2 = β2 then (s1, . . . ,
sm) does not appear in γ1.
It is clear that |γ1| = |γ2|.
We want to show that
Rγ1 = Rγ2
Observe that Rβ1 = Rβ2 . Since γ1 is an extension of β1 along the sequence of
nodes (s1, . . . , sm) and γ2 is the extension of β2 along the sequence (s1, . . . , sm)
(same sequence) and they both start at |β1| = |β2| with Rβ1 = Rβ2 , then they end
up at the same relation, namely Rγ1 = Rγ2 . Hence γ1 ≡ γ2.
We now finish the proof of Lemma 3.2:
4. Since γ1 ≡ γ2 and γ1 extends α1, we get α1/ ≡ ρ γ2/ ≡
5. Clearly ρ is the reflexive and transitive closure of ρ1. unionsq
Lemma 3.3 Let m = (S, R, a, h) and let ≡,, ρ be as in Definition 3.1. Consider
μ = (, ρ, a/ ≡, h), as an ordinary Kripke model, where h is defined by
α/ ≡ ∈ h(q) iff |α| ∈ h(q).
Then for any A we have:
α  A in m iff α/ ≡  A in μ.
Proof By induction on A.
1. For q atomic this holds by the definition of ≡.
2. The key case is that of →.
Assume α  A → B, then for some β which is a legitimate extension of α we have
β  A and β  B. But we also have in this case that α/ ≡ ρ β/ ≡ and by the induction
hypothesis, β/ ≡  A and β/ ≡  B.
Now assume α/≡  A → B. Then for some γ /≡ we have α/≡ ργ/ ≡ and
γ /≡  A and γ /≡  B. Therefore for some α1 ≡ α and γ1 ≡ γ we have
γ1 = α1 ∗ (t1, . . . , tk) and γ1 is a legitimate extension of α1. Hence since γ1 ≡ γ ,
we get γ1/≡  A and γ1/≡  B. By the induction hypothesis we have γ1  A and
γ1  B.
Now look at the two models mα = (S, Rα, |α|) and mα1 = (S, Rα1 , |α1|). Since
α1 ≡ α, these two models are the same. So having γ1 = α1 ∗ (t1, . . . , tk) with γ1  A
and γ1  B in mγ1 implies that for δ = α ∗ (t1, . . . , tk) we also have δ  A adn δ  B
in mα . Hence α  A → B in m. unionsq
Corollary 3.4 The proof of Lemma 3.2 actually gives us a stronger result. Suppose
we have a situation as described in Fig. 8 below, then there exist sequences of points
from S of the form
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Fig. 8 Unfolded reactive model
(a, t y1 , . . . , t
y
k(y)) = α(y)
(a, t z1 , . . . , t
z
k(z)) = α(z)
(tu1 , . . . , t
u
k(u)) = α(u)
(tw1 , . . . , t
w
k(w)) = α(w)
(sw1 , . . . , s
w
m(w)) = β(w)




α(y), α(z), α(y) ∗ α(u),
α(z) ∗ α(v), α(y) ∗ α(w),
α(z) ∗ β(w)
are all legitimate extensions of (a) and we have
α(y) ≡ y
α(z) ≡ z
α(y) ∗ α(u) ≡ u
α(z) ∗ α(v) ≡ v
α(y) ∗ α(w) ≡ w
α(z) ∗ β(w) ≡ w
In other words, Fig. 8 from μ can be realised by actual continuous legitimate paths
in m.
In fact, we can get a general result.
Define in μ = (, ρ, a/ ≡, h) the following immediate successor relation ρ11:
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• x/ ≡ ρ11 y/ ≡ iff x/ ≡ ρ y/ ≡ and x ≡ y and for all z/ ≡, if s/ ≡ ρ z/ ≡ and
z/ ≡ ρ y/ ≡, then either z ≡ x or z ≡ y.
Since x/ ≡ ρ y/ ≡ means that for some (t1, . . . , tk, s1, . . . , sm) we have α =
(a, t1, . . . , tk) ≡ x and β = (a, t1, . . . , tk, s1, . . . , sm) ≡ y. The condition α/ ≡
ρ11 β/ ≡ means that each β j = α ∗ (s1, . . . , s j ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, is either ≡
equivalent to α or to β. Since α ≡ β, each si is either tk or sm.
Note that ρ1 and ρ11 are different relations. ρ1 is defined on legitimate sequences
of  while ρ11 is defined on / ≡. We may have that xρ1 y holds but x/ ≡ ρ11 y/ ≡
does not hold. However, if we have x/ ≡ ρ11 y/ ≡ then for some x ′ ≡ x, y′ ≡ y we
have x ′ρ1 y′ holds.
The general result we get is the following:
Let μ0 = (0, ρ11  0, a/ ≡) be any finite submodel of  with ρ11 restricted to
μ0. Then the model μ0 can be realised by actual sequences from m.
Remark 3.5 (Folding reactive frames) We started with a reactive model m =
(S, R, a, h) and converted it to a special model μ = (, ρ, a/ ≡, h). This model
is special and we want to highlight some of its properties.
First note that if m is finite then we can effectively derive μ from m in tractable
time. This observation is important because we shall use μ to develop Beth tableaux
for m.
We now examine μ more closely.
The elements of  are equivalence classes of legitimate sequences β of m. We
have
• α ≡ β iff |α| = |β| and Rα = Rβ .
Let m = (S, R, a, h). Let T be the set of all legitimate sequences of m. We define
two equivalence relations on T.
• α ≈ β iff |α| = |β|
• α ≈R β iff Rα = Rβ
The relation ≡ is the intersection of the above two relations. So if E1, . . . , Ek are all
the ≈ equivalence subsets of T and D1, . . . , Dm are all the ≈R equivalence subsets
of T, then the equivalence subsets of ≡ are all the different combinations of the form
Ti, j = Ei ∩ D j i = 1, . . . , , j = 1, . . . , m.
Actually, if S = {s1, . . . , sk} then we can have




Ti, j | i = 1, . . . , k;j = 1, . . . , m
}
Let us now look at the class Ei , for fixed i . Let
α = (a, t1, . . . , tr , e) and β = (a, s1, . . . , sr , e)
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be two elements of this class. We have |α| = |β| = e ∈ S. Let us ask: Are α, β also in
the same class D j for some j? Well maybe they are, depending on whether Rα = Rβ .
We can regard ≈ also as an equivalence relation on  = {Ti, j }:
• Ti, j ≈ Tm,n iff i = m.
This means that for any α ∈ Ti, j , β ∈ Tm,n we have |α| = |β|.
But |α| = |β| means h(α) = h(β), since h(α) = h(|α|) and h(β) = h(|β|).
We can now view the model μ with ≈ as a model of the form
μ = (, ρ,≈, a/ ≡, h)
with an equivalence relation ≈ on  and the commitment:
x ≈ y → h(x) = h(y). (∗)
This model satisfies special properties, because we know that μ = (, ρ, a/ ≡,≈)
arises from a model m = (S, R, a) through a special construction.
We would like to list these special properties so that we can prove that any model
μ with these properties comes from some reactive model m.
We believe that this is possible to do.
Conjecture 3.6 It is possible to give conditions on ρ and ≈ of a folded Kripke model
which ensure it is equivalent to a reactive Kripke model (without ≈).
Example 3.7 (Fig. 6) We saw that the reactive Kripke frame of Fig. 6 can be presented
as the folded Kripke frame of Fig. 7. We have in Fig. 7:
 = {t, s, (t, t)}
ρ = {(t, t), (t, s), (s, s), (t, (t, t)), ((t, t), (t, t))}
and we have t ≈ (t, t).
Remark 3.8 Let us see what is the status of folded Kripke frames in terms of Heyting
algebras. An ordinary Kripke frame m = (, ρ) gives rise to a free Heyting algebra
Hm. When we add an equivalence relation ≈ to form μ = (, ρ,≈) we are adding
some equalities among the free generators of Hm. These equalities generate a congru-
ence relation  on Hm. If we let Hμ = Hm/  then we get the algebra corresponding
to μ. It is not a free algebra.
4 Reactive tableaux
We begin by explaining the intuitive idea of tableaux for reactive logics. Consider the
tableau of Fig. 9
The label of the tableau is t . This is usually the name of the possible world we are
dealing with. A is on the left and so we want to make t  A and C → D is on the
right hand side of the tableau, so we want to make t  C → D.
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Fig. 9 tab1
Fig. 10 tab2
To do the latter we need an accessible world s. such that t R∗s and s  A and s  B.
This means that we move into the following tableau in Fig. 10
A carries on into s and in s, we put C on the left and D on the right.4
This is the usual tableau process for intuitionistic logic. If we have ∧ and ∨ in the
language, we might get different alternatives (tableau splitting). Let us assume our lan-
guage contains only → so that we can concentrate on the differences between ordinary
tableaux and reactive tableaux, without the complexity generated by the presence of
∧ and ∨.
In the case of pre-reactive semantics of Definition 2.3 the tableau will have labels
α, β which are paths. So t = α and s = β. This is not an essential difference. The dif-
ference is essential in the reactive case because we must require that β is a legitimate
extension of α. To do that we must record what Rβ is.
So to simplify even further and allow us to present the essential ideas of the reactive
tableau let us assume our logic has a fixed finite reactive frame, (S, R, a).
In this case we get the following simplifications:
(S1.) Since the frame is finite and for any legitimate sequence β, Rβ is smaller than
R, there is only a finite number of frames (S, Ri ), i = 1, . . . , n, that are at play,
(S2.) We can move to the finite folded Kripke frame μ = (, ρ,≈, a) and do our
tableaux on μ. This is significantly simpler because μ is like an ordinary Kripke
frame with the additional simple condition (simple from the tableaux point of
view) imposed by ≈.
The next definition gives the notion of Beth tableaux for the implicational fragment.
Note three facts:
Fact 1 Every wff can be put in the form
E = [A1 → (. . . → (An → q) . . .)]
4 A carries into s because in an intuitionistic Kripke model we have that for any A:
t  A and t Rs → s  A.
Note that if for some reason we want that t and s agree on the values of atoms q, then any atom in the right
hand side of t will also carry to the right hand side of s.
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where q is atomic and each Ai is of the same form as E .
Fact 2 We need only two tableaux rules:
• To make E false (E on the right) at world t , find a world s such that tρs and put
all Ai on the left and q on the right.
• To make E true on the left at t when q is on the right at t , we must move one of
Ai to the right of t to make A j false.
Fact 3 To accommodate ≈ we make some adjustments to the usual intuitionistic tab-
leaux rules.
Definition 4.1 (Beth tableaux for folded Kripke frames) Let μ = (, ρ,≈) be a
folded frame.
1. A tableau for μ is a pair of functions (τ+, τ−) from  into the set of wffs satisfying
the following conditions:
(a) If tρs holds in μ then τ+(t) ⊆ τ+(s)
(b) If t ≈ s holds then τ±(t) and τ±(s) contain the same atoms (respectively)
2. Let T be a family of tableaux τ as in (1). Let τ ∈ T. We define an operation which
will split τ into several alternatives and we will replace τ in T by these alternatives
to obtain a new family T′.
Right hand operation
Choose t ∈  and choose E in τ−(t). Get the following alternatives τ±s to replace
τ by {τs |s ∈  and t Rs} where
τ−s (x) =
{
τ−(x), for x ≈ s
t−(x) ∪ {q} for x ≈ s, x = t




τ+(x) if x ≈ s
τ+(x) ∪ {Ai |Ai atomic} if x ≈ s and x = s
τ+(t) ∪ {A − i} if x = t
Left hand operation
Choose t ∈  and choose E in τ+(t) such that q ∈ τ−(t).
Recall that E = [A1 → (. . . → (An → q))].
For each Ai form the following tableau τi .




τ−(x) ∪ {Ai }, if Ai is atomic and x ≈ t.
τ−(x) if x ≈ t
t−(t) ∪ {Ai } if x = t.
3. A tableau τ is closed if for some t ∈  we have τ+(t) ∩ τ−(t) = ∅.
4. T is closed iff all of its alternatives are closed.
Theorem 4.2 (Completeness) The above procedure is complete for the logic defined
by the frame μ.
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Proof Modify a proof for the case of an ordinary intuitionistic frame. unionsq
Definition 4.3 (Beth tableau for reactive Kripke frame) Let m = (S, R, a) be a reac-
tive frame. Let μ = (, ρ,≈) be the folded frame effectively obtained from m. Let A
be a wff for which we seek a counter model. Execute the algorithm of Definition 4.1.
If an assignment h is found which falsifies A in μ, then the corresponding assignment
h is found which falsifies A in μ, then the corresponding assignment h will falsify A
in m. If the tableaux is closed and no such assignment exists, then no such assignment
exists in m. Thus the logic of m can be characterised using tableaux. Given a class K
of finite reactive frames then the logic of K can be characterised as the intersection
of the logics of its members. See Footnote 3.
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